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Someone who dies: a face that becomes a masque. The expression disappears. The experience of death that is not mine is an "experience" of the death of *someone*, someone who from the outset is beyond biological processes, who is associated with me as someone.

The soul, reified as some-thing, is, phenomenologically, what shows itself in the nonreified face; it shows itself in expression and, in this appearing, has the structure or the glimmer [*la pointe*] of someone. That which Descartes makes a substance, all the while protesting against the image of the pilot in his vessel [*nacelle*], that from which Leibniz makes a monad, that which Plato posits as the soul contemplating the Ideas, that which Spinoza thinks as a mode of thought, is described phenomenologically as a *face*. Without this phenomenology, one is pushed toward a reification of the soul, whereas here a problem other than to be or not to be is posed, a problem prior to that question.

The death of someone is not—despite everything that seemed so at first glance—an empirical facticity (death as empirical facticity whose universality induction alone could suggest); it is not exhausted in this appearing.

Someone who expresses himself in his nudity—the face—is one to the point of appealing to me, of placing himself under my responsibility: Henceforth, I have to respond for him. All the gestures of the other were signs addressed to me. To continue the progression sketched above: to show oneself, to express oneself, to associate oneself, *to be entrusted to me* [*m'êtré confié*]. The other who expresses himself is entrusted to me (and there is no debt in regard to the other, for what is due is unpayable: one is never free of it). The other individuates me in the responsibility I have for him. The death of the other who dies affects me in my very identity as a responsible "me" [*moi*]; it affects me in my nonsubstantial identity, which is not the simple coherence of various acts of identification, but is made up of an ineffable responsibility. My being affected by the death of the other is precisely that, my relation with his death. It is, in my relation, my deference to someone who no longer responds, already a culpability—the culpability of the survivor.

This relation is reduced to a secondhand experience on the pre-