

Executive Summary

This essay examines the Qur'an 13:14 verse and a sweep of landmark legal codes (from Hammurabi's Code to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) as two parallel systems organizing authority and address. It shows how the Quranic notion of **directed invocation** (دعوة *du'ā'*/دعوة *da'wah* "call" to God) and its water-parable are formally analogous to how law conceptualizes legitimate address and obedience. First, we close-read Quran 13:14, explaining key Arabic terms (دعوة *da'wah*, الحق *al-ḥaqq*, باسط كفيه *bāsit kaffayhi*, ضلال *ḍalāl*) and presenting a line-by-line comparison of four reputable English translations (Sahih International, Yusuf Ali, Abdel Haleem, Ahmed Ali). We note two classical tafsīr interpretations of the water image: one where the thirsty man cannot reach the water (distance) and one where the water is at hand but his approach is futile (misrelation).

Next, we trace a comparative history of law, treating each foundational text as a *phenomenological horizon* and dialectical stage. From Hammurabi (17th c. BCE, "oriental" despotism) through Rome's Twelve Tables (5th c. BCE, Classical law), Justinian (6th c. CE, Roman/Christian Empire), Magna Carta (1215, feudal constitutionalism), the English Bill of Rights (1689, parliamentary supremacy), the US Constitution and Bill of Rights (1787–1791, liberal republic), to the UDHR (1948, global human dignity), we highlight how each new code made law more self-explicit and universal. We interpret this evolution teleologically in a Hegelian sense (self-conscious freedom unfolding) and phenomenologically via Husserl (each code presupposes and reshapes a background "world-horizon" of authority and rights).

A key theme is "**directedness**": the Quran emphasizes that only God properly answers supplication, and similarly only properly constituted authority can legitimately command obedience. We argue that both sacred invocation and legal normativity depend on correctly addressing a recognized sovereign: God or the State. This homology suggests that secular law inherits a structure of invocation—people "call upon" the law in petitions and expect justice from an impersonal sovereign. Modern constitutionalism and human-rights discourse, with their appeal to the universal "We the People" or "All humankind," are thus continuations of this trajectory of address and legitimacy.

Finally, the essay reflects on methodology: combining philological exegesis (of Arabic and ancient legal texts) with a phenomenological outlook. The goal is not to force a single narrative, but to show how a *legal consciousness*—like a religious one—grows by broadening its implicit horizons.

The analysis uses primary texts and authoritative commentaries (e.g. Ibn Kathīr, al-Ṭabarī) throughout. Tables compare translations of 13:14 and key terms, and mermaid diagrams map the verse's logic and the timeline of legal codifications.

Exegesis of Qur'an 13:14 (Arabic and Translations)

Arabic text. Qur'an 13:14 reads:

لَهُ دَعْوَةُ الْحَقِّ وَالَّذِينَ يَدْعُونَ مِنْ دُونِهِ لَا يَسْتَجِيبُونَ لَهُمْ بِشَيْءٍ إِلَّا كَبَاسِطٌ كَفَّيْهِ إِلَى الْمَاءِ لِيَبْلُغَ فَاهُ وَمَا هُوَ بِبَالِغِهِ وَمَا دُعَاءُ
 (الْكَافِرِينَ إِلَّا فِي ضَلَالٍ)
*"Lahu da'watul-ḥaqq wa-alladhīna yad'ūna min dūnihi lā yastajībūna lahum bishay'in illā ka-bāsiṭi
 kaffayhi ilā l-mā'i liyablughā fāhu wa mā huwa bibālighih; wa mā du'ā'u l-kāfirīna illā fī ḍalālīn."*

Here دَعْوَةُ (da'wah) means "call" or "invocation" (especially a prayer), الْحَقِّ (al-ḥaqq) means "the Truth" or "what is right/reality," كَبَاسِطٌ (bāsiṭ) is "spreading out" (here "one who spreads out"), كَفَّيْهِ (kaffayhi) "his two hands," and ضَلَالٍ (ḍalālīn) means "error, misguidance." Literally the verse says: "To Him [alone] belongs the call of Truth. And those whom they invoke besides Him do not respond to them in any way – except like one who stretches out his two hands toward the water, to make it reach his mouth, but it does not reach; and the call of the disbelievers is only in error."

The **common meaning** (see Table 1 below) is that only God truly hears and answers prayer, whereas supplicating idols or other deities is futile. The water simile illustrates that futility.

Table 1: Line-by-line comparison of four translations of Qur'an 13:14. We align major phrases to see differences in wording.

Arabic & Key Phrases	Sahih International	Yusuf Ali	Abdel Haleem	Ahmed Ali (Muhsin Khan)
لَهُ دَعْوَةُ الْحَقِّ	"To Him [alone] is the supplication of truth..." [3†L69-L73]	"For Him [alone] is prayer in Truth..." [19†L34-L37]	"The only true prayer is to Him..." [29†L503-L506]	"To Him alone is the Word of Truth..." (†)
وَالَّذِينَ يَدْعُونَ مِنْ دُونِهِ	"...And those they call upon besides Him..." [3†L69-L73]	"...and those they invoke besides Him..." [19†L34-L37]	"...those they pray to besides Him..." [29†L503-L506]	"...those whom they invoke besides Him..."
لَا يَسْتَجِيبُونَ لَهُمْ بِشَيْءٍ إِلَّا	"...do not respond to them with a thing, except as..." [3†L69-L73]	"...give them no answer..." [19†L34-L37]	"...give them no answer any more than..." [29†L503-L506]	"...give them no answer... except as if..." [24†L256-L259]
كَبَاسِطٍ كَفَّيْهِ إِلَى الْمَاءِ	"...like one who stretches his hands toward water..." [3†L69-L73]	"...(as the one) who stretches forth his hands toward water..." [19†L34-L37]	"...as a man who stretches his hands towards the water..." [29†L503-L506]	"...like one who stretches his hands toward the water..."

Arabic & Key Phrases	Sahih International	Yusuf Ali	Abdel Haleem	Ahmed Ali (Muhsin Khan)
لِيَبْلُغَ فَاهُ وَمَا هُوَ بِنَالِغِهِ	"...[calling] that it might reach his mouth, but it will not reach it." [3†L69-L73]	"...so that it may reach his mouth, but it does not reach it." [19†L34-L37]	"...that it may reach his mouth, but it cannot reach it." [29†L503-L506]	"...to reach his mouth, but it will not reach it."
وَمَا دُعَاءُ الْكَافِرِينَ إِلَّا فِي ضَلَالٍ	"And the supplication of the disbelievers is not but in error [i.e. futility]." [3†L69-L73]	"The prayers of the unbelievers are [but] in vain." [19†L34-L37]	"...the prayers of the disbelievers are all in vain." [29†L503-L506]	"...and the call of the disbelievers is not but error."

(*) "Word of Truth" is a particular gloss (often meaning God or the Gospel) but contextually here "supplication" or "prayer" is intended.

Key observations: All translators agree on the structure: God alone answers (**la hu da'watu l-ḥaqq**), others "do not respond" except with the water-analogy, and disbelievers' prayers are futile. Minor differences: Sahih Int. and Haleem emphasize *supplication/prayer of truth*, whereas Yusuf Ali and Ahmed Ali foreground *prayer in Truth* or *Word of Truth*. These nuances all point to the same idea: a genuine prayer must be directed to the Ultimate Truth (Allah), not to mere idols.

Key terms (Table 2) include دعوة (*da'wah*, "invocation" or "call" to God), الحق (*al-ḥaqq*, "the Truth"/"the Real," also one of God's names), باسط كفيه (*bāsit kaffayhi*, "one who stretches out his two hands"), and ضلال (*ḍalāl*, "error" or "going astray"). Their semantic ranges will guide interpretation (e.g. *da'wah* can mean invitation or prayer, *al-ḥaqq* can connote moral truth or reality, *ḍalāl* implies misdirection or delusion). See Table 2 below.




Figure: Logical flow of Qur'an 13:14 (Invocation → Contrast → Parable → Conclusion).

Table 2: Key Arabic terms in 13:14

Term	Transliteration	Gloss / Semantic Range
دَعْوَةٌ (da'wah)	da'wah	"call, invitation, invocation, prayer" – here: act of calling on a deity.
حَقٌّ (al-ḥaqq)	al-ḥaqq	"the Truth, Reality, the Right," also "the True One" (a divine attribute).

Term	Transliteration	Gloss / Semantic Range
بَاسِط (bāsit)	bāsit	"one who spreads out / extends [hands]" (active participle of basata).
كَفَّيْهِ (kaffayhi)	kaffayhi ("his two hands")	Dual form: "his pair of hands."
ضَلَّال (ḍalāl)	ḍalāl	"error, misguidance, going astray."

Notes: The verse's phrase *da'watul-ḥaqq* ("the call of Truth") is classically interpreted as the monotheistic creed *lā ilāha illallāh* ("no god but God" 【5†L139-L147】). The imagery *basit kaffayhi ilā l-mā'* emphasizes a physical gesture of praying with outstretched hands. *Ḍalāl* connotes utter futility or wandering from the right path.

Classical Tafsīr of the Water Parable

Two *tafāṣīr* (classical commentaries) offer distinct emphases on the water simile:

- **Far-out Water (Distance reading):** 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (cited in Tafsīr al-Jalālayn 【5†L139-L147】) explained the man as standing at the rim of a very deep well. He stretches his hands desperately toward the distant water, but his arms simply cannot reach it. The emphasis here is on *inaccessibility*: the water (i.e. the aid he seeks) is physically too far away. This illustrates the idols' powerlessness: like the man, idolaters pray earnestly, but their object of worship can't actually deliver aid.
- **Present Water, Wrong Approach (Misrelation reading):** Mujāhid (cited in Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr 【5†L139-L147】) offered a complementary view. In his reading, the water is already at hand – perhaps at the well's edge – but the man merely beckons to it instead of drinking. He **calls** upon the water *with words and gesture*, as if summoning it to him, but of course nothing happens. The folly here is the *wrong mode of address*: the means of quenching thirst (drinking) are ignored in favor of a vain incantation. Classically, this underscores that idolaters may have the truth available to them but engage it wrongly – they perform rituals expecting miracles, rather than "drinking" from God's grace.

Both interpretations appear in Ibn Kathīr's summary 【5†L139-L147】. Together they show the parable's depth: either the water is unreachable or the man's method is simply ineffective. The common point is that *the effort (stretching hands, praying) produces no result* – just as calling on any but the true God yields no benefit.

Development of Legal Consciousness: From Divine Decree to Universal Rights

We now turn to the parallel evolution of *legal* systems. The history of law, from **Hammurabi's Code** (c. 1750 BCE) to the **UDHR** (1948), can be seen as a gradual expansion of the "we" and "you" in law – of who is addressed and who speaks. Each founding text not only laid down rules, but also implicitly redefined

authority and obligation. Below we outline each milestone, noting its context and how it shifted the *horizon* of what law means (in Husserlian terms) and how it advanced freedom (in Hegelian terms).

- **Code of Hammurabi (Babylon, c. 1754 BCE).** Hammurabi, king of Babylon, inscribed ~282 laws on a stone stele (now in the Louvre) [49†L236-L242] . Justice is declared as “*the command of the gods*” – law is given by a deity (Shamash) to the king, who enforces it. Society is sharply hierarchical (patriarchal, monarchical, caste-like), and punishments are explicit (often “eye for eye” style). *Husserlian horizon:* world is assumed theocentric and status-based; law is not a choice of the people but the king’s divine will. *Hegelian stage:* this is the “Oriental” stage where law is the *king’s morality* incarnate; true freedom or subjectivity is largely absent. Law’s address is top-down: subjects obey the king *qua* divine deputy.
- **Twelve Tables (Rome, c. 451–449 BCE).** Facing class conflict (patricians vs. plebeians), the Roman Republic publicly codified customary laws in twelve bronze tablets in the Forum. These covered family law, contracts, trials, debt, etc. Unlike Hammurabi’s theocratic code, the Twelve Tables were made by a commission and appealed to the *People’s Assembly* (the Centuriate), reflecting republican consent. *Husserlian horizon:* the context of Rome’s *civitas* (citizenship) and religion (no single “giver” of law; it is emergent custom). Reading them presumes Rome’s dual social order, but they make law *explicit and public*. *Hegelian stage:* classical antiquity, a move toward individual legal status (e.g. property rights, written procedure). Here we see a nascent universalism: Roman law begins to treat citizens as bearers of abstract legal rights (though citizenship itself is exclusive).
- **Corpus Juris Civilis (Justinian’s Code, Byzantium 529–534 CE).** Emperor Justinian ordered jurists to consolidate Roman law into a single codex (Codex, Digesta, Institutiones). It did not create new rights, but systematized existing principles for all the Empire. *Husserlian horizon:* blends Greco-Roman law with Christian ethics – law is seen as rational and universal, not just traditional. The Code presupposes an emperor who is both secular and (by now) a church-governed sovereign. *Hegelian stage:* this is the mature **Roman-Imperial** stage of world history: law is abstract, logical, and state-centered. It represents the *universal state* – an attempt to reconcile individual customs into an overarching legal “mind.” The address has shifted: law speaks to everyone as Roman citizens (eventually to all subjects of an empire), and the emperor claims a rational authority, not just ritual power.
- **Magna Carta (England, 1215).** In 1215, English barons compelled King John to sign a charter limiting royal power. Notably, **Clause 39** declares: “*No free man shall be seized, imprisoned, dispossessed... except by the lawful judgment of his peers and the law of the land.*” And **Clause 40**: “*We will not sell, refuse or delay justice to anyone.*” [49†L236-L242] . For the first time, an absolute monarch’s will was openly constrained by “the law of the land.” *Husserlian horizon:* the feudal-Christian world now includes the *idea* that kings are under law. The Charter presumes a society of “free men” (noble barons) while still largely excluding peasants and women; still, the implicit horizon has widened to envisage *universal application* of certain principles. *Hegelian stage:* this begins the “Germanic” or “medieval” phase: it is a dialectical synthesis of monarchy (thesis) and aristocratic rights (antithesis). Law here is not simply royal decree but a *contract* between ruler and subjects. The address in the Charter shifts toward “the king and the community” – justice belongs to the realm, not just the monarch’s whim. This seed later sprouts into constitutionalism and due process.

- **English Bill of Rights (1689).** After the Glorious Revolution, Parliament enacted a Bill of Rights affirming limits on the crown. It forbids royal dispensing with laws, guarantees free elections, and for example states “*excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted*” [51†L117-L119] . It also enshrined free speech in Parliament and other liberties. *Husserlian horizon:* by late 17th c. Protestant Enlightenment, the horizon includes natural rights and parliamentary sovereignty. The English were now thinking of government legitimacy in terms of consent and law, not divine right. *Hegelian stage:* constitutional monarchy, where liberty and law are in tension but moving toward liberal statehood. Parliamentary (and later popular) will is recognized; law is both *arbitrary* (legislative, accountable) and *universalizing* (rights to all Englishmen). The Bill of Rights addresses future rulers: “king and queen” must govern according to law. It also addresses individuals: granting them claims (e.g. jury trials, petition rights) that the state must respect.
- **US Constitution (1787) & Bill of Rights (1791).** Framed by the Founders, this created a federal republic with separation of powers. The Preamble “We the People” asserted that the people were the sovereign source. Article III guarantees trial by jury, Article V forbids taking life/liberty/property “*without due process of law*”, and the First Amendment forbids laws “abridging... the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government” [53†L182-L185] . *Husserlian horizon:* Enlightenment rationalism and social-contract ideas are explicit. The implicit background now includes Locke’s natural rights, but the Constitution itself places legitimacy in “the People” acting through institutions. *Hegelian stage:* the liberal-democratic stage. This form treats individuals as bearers of universal human rights (later extended to all citizens). Law’s address becomes highly reflective: it speaks both as a constitution (abstract, universal) and through dynamic institutions (congress, courts). The Bill of Rights specifically addresses and limits the *created* government’s power, asserting that legitimate authority comes only from the consent of the governed.
- **Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948).** After World War II, the UN proclaimed a global charter of rights. Article 1 famously declares: “*All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.*” [59†L49-L52] It was adopted by diverse nations, implying a truly universal horizon. *Husserlian horizon:* postwar global community with secular humanism. The UDHR presupposes notions of *global personhood* and a shared humanity that earlier eras did not. Every clause is addressed to “*everyone*” or “*no one*” – a radical expansion of address. *Hegelian stage:* this may be seen as a (posthumous) apex: the idea that law and rights can encompass all humanity. In Hegelian terms, it suggests the emergence of “world history” wherein freedom is recognized everywhere. The UDHR’s language elevates rights as objective moral content; states (and peoples) are now subject to the norms that the world community has declared. It is an embodiment of freedom *consciously* recognized at the global level.




Figure: Timeline of the seven foundational legal texts (dates approximate).

Each step “unpacks” more freedom and more subjects. In Hegel’s philosophy of history, this is no accident: *“Self-conscious Reason, or Spirit, is gradually becoming conscious of its own freedom”* [64†L79-L87] . Hegel divided history into East (Oriental despotic law), Greco-Roman (classical law and republicanism), and Germanic (modern constitutionalism) stages [64†L91-L99] . Our legal landmarks trace this progression: Hammurabi (~Oriental), Rome and Justinian (classical), then the Western constitutional moments (Germanic and modern).

Concretely, with each new code the **address** of law shifted. Early law addressed subjects simply as villagers or “slaves/freedmen” under a ruler. Magna Carta and later charters began addressing *the ruler by the law* (the king is not above the law). By the US Constitution, law explicitly addresses *the People* as a collective subject. Finally, the UDHR addresses *all humans everywhere*. This recapitulates the Quran’s structure: invocation must be correctly *addressed* to the true addressee (God). Similarly, legal legitimacy depends on addressing the right authority with the right personhood – a sovereign state, or ultimately humanity itself.

Directed Invocation and Legal Legitimacy

The formal parallel is this: **prayer is a speech-act directed to God**, while **legal force is an act of authority directed to society**. In both cases the act’s efficacy depends on correct “addressability.” The Quranic verse underscores that “calling on God alone” (*du’ā’* to Allah) is efficacious [3†L69-L73] . Prayers directed elsewhere are met with silence or error. Likewise, a law or command has authority only if it is directed by the proper sovereign or legal order. An Ottoman sultan’s decree, a Sharia court’s ruling, or a mob’s will all have meaning *only within the horizon that recognizes their legitimacy*.

This homology can be seen in several ways:

- **Legitimacy of the addressee:** In the Qur’an, God alone is inherently able to respond. In legal terms, only a legitimate sovereign body can issue binding law. For example, Hammurabi’s laws claimed divine sanction; Magna Carta asserted that even the king must abide by higher law; the US Constitution makes law emanate from “the People.” Each is asserting who the rightful addressee of obedience is. (In 13:14, the idols *cannot* answer – likewise, under English law any edict “without Parliament” was considered illegitimate [51†L117-L119] .)

- **Subject's standing:** The verse addresses "the supplication of truth" as belonging to *God* [3†L69-L73] . This implies that a *subject* – the praying believer – gains validity only by linking to the true source. Comparably, the "law of the land" in Magna Carta and due process in the U.S. recognize that a person's rights depend on being counted as a rightful "subject" (e.g. a citizen or free man). Without that status, the legal formulas wouldn't apply. Husserl's notion of horizon reminds us that what counts as "rightful petition" evolved: a Saxon peasant in 1215 didn't have Magna Carta's due process, but by 1789 Frenchmen claimed their universal rights at Versailles.
- **Form of invocation vs. norm:** The Quranic parable emphasizes how *form matters*: the man must actually *drink* the water, not just gesture. In law, form also matters: valid law follows particular procedures (legislation, signatures, publication). An address may look like a law but if it violates form, it is "misaddressed." (E.g. King James II's edicts without Parliament were void [51†L117-L119] .) The English Bill of Rights explicitly abolishes the king's old ways of suspending statutes [51†L117-L119] . This is akin to saying the genie in Aladdin works only if you rub the lamp correctly.
- **Concept of error/misstep:** The verse calls disbelievers' invocation *error* (ضلال) [3†L69-L73] . In jurisprudence, we have similar language: *ultra vires*, *null and void*, etc. When a person sues in a court that has no jurisdiction, their summons is "misaddressed" and of no force. If an entire constitution is tyrannical, later texts may declare it illegitimate (as with the replacement of King John or James II). Human-rights discourse uses "violation" language: a human right is *inviolable* by any law that misaddresses its bearer.

In sum, **both systems depend on correctly "calling" the right addressee with the right form.** The Quranic case makes the theological point: only God is the Receiver of true prayer. The legal-historical narrative makes the secular point: only agreed lawful authority is the Receiver of societal obedience. And just as the Quran implicitly assumes a universe where the non-responding idols belong to the same *lifeworld* (they answer like "water doesn't come"), legal consciousness assumes a common law-world where illegitimate powers answer "with nothing."

Implications for Modern Constitutionalism and Human Rights

This structural analogy has concrete implications. Modern constitutions and rights charters often mirror religious tropes of invocation: "We the People" echoes "O mankind, worship your Lord." Liberty in political theory can be seen as "being taken by the right hand" – the constitution guides citizens as God guides believers. When courts say "Equality before the law," it resonates with Quranic *allāh yu'allimu l-insānu mā lam yakun ya'lamu* ("Allah teaches humanity what it did not know" – 2:151, loosely). The UDHR's universalism even mirrors the universalism of monotheism.

However, the comparison also warns of limits. A state that claims the final word on rights can become like an idol. Indeed, secular tragedies (totalitarianism) show how "directed invocation" can be perverted when the addressee is mistaken. Recognizing the homology reminds constitutionalists that laws too are always provisional "calls" to authority that derive meaning from broader principles (reason, conscience, dignity). This underlies doctrines like constitutional review: courts essentially pray for justice by invoking the "spirit" of the constitution, not just the letter.

In human-rights discourse, the idea that every person has innate dignity is itself a kind of invocation of humanity's ultimate moral law. Our analysis suggests such universal claims grew naturally out of law's own unfolding: Hammurabi's stele already asserts a divine moral order (God on the stele), and by 1948 that order is explicitly *global*. Hegelian teleology sees this as a culminating moment (the "spirit of freedom" recognizing itself globally [64†L79-L87]), while a phenomenologist would caution that the UDHR operates within its own cultural-historical horizon and must continually be re-grounded in lived experience.

Methodology Note: Philology and Phenomenology

This study deliberately blends **philology** (careful analysis of texts and translations) with a **phenomenological perspective**. On the philological side, we did not rely on any single translation or interpretation of Qur'an 13:14, but collected multiple reputable ones and classical commentaries (Table 1 and Tafsīr notes) to reveal latent meanings. Similarly, for the legal texts we cited official versions and respected sources (parliament.uk, U.S. archives, UN archives). This safeguards against reading modern assumptions back into ancient words.

On the phenomenological side, we treated each legal code as a *horizon of meaning* (in Husserl's sense). We asked: what background assumptions does the Code of Hammurabi presuppose about authority and justice? How does Magna Carta enlarge the horizon to imagine "rights" beyond a single king's will? This approach, complementary to Hegel's, avoids a naive linear "progress" story by highlighting the implicit context of each step.

The comparative frame – Qur'an vs. law – is itself phenomenological: it reveals how both systems are structured by the notion of address and response. We have traced a *transformation of legal consciousness*: law, like prayer, begins in particularistic authority (king/god) and moves toward universal address (citizen/all humans). Whether one calls this Hegelian or simply a broad pattern, the dual analysis underscores that authority (divine or legal) only exercises meaning when it is recognized as such by its intended addressees.

Conclusion

Qur'an 13:14 and the evolution of law share a **structural logic of address and response**. The Quranic verse makes explicit that true invocation must be directed *straight* to God, with no intermediaries. In parallel, legal history shows that legitimate commands must be directed *justly* – to the right sovereign and under the right procedure – or else they fail.

From Hammurabi's monarchic decrees to the UDHR's universal mandates, law has progressively "learned" to articulate its authority more reflectively. Each new legal code redefines who speaks and who listens. In Hegelian terms, this is the world-historical march of freedom gaining self-awareness [64†L79-L87] . In Husserlian terms, it is the constant shift in the implicit horizons of our legal world – what counts as "lawful" or "just" is broadened each time.

The upshot is that **directedness** – correct orientation of speech-act to its target – is a key principle across both domains. In religious life, this means true prayer; in political life, it means rightful law. Both ultimately rest on the idea of an appropriate "receiver" of our appeals: God for prayer, and the rule-of-law (embodied in people or institutions) for justice. Recognizing this kinship enriches our understanding of authority and opens a dialogue between theology and legal philosophy.

The essay has drawn on primary sources (original texts, translations, classical commentary) and rigorous comparison. The parallels are not forced; they emerge from how both systems address the same problem: **how to make valid appeals to authority**. The conclusion is that in both realms, misaddress – whether a misdirected prayer or an illegitimate law – leads to “it shall not reach” (لَا يَبْلُغُ). In a universal sense, this insight undergirds modern commitments that “*no one is above the law*” and “*all people are brothers and sisters*” – secular and sacred expressions of the same logic of directed invocation.
